Introduction
The Iran-Iraq war lasted nearly eight years, from September of 1980 until August of 1989, and resulted in more than one and a half million war and war-related casualties. At the end, virtually none of the issues which are usually blamed for the war had been resolved. The UN-arranged cease-fire merely put an end to the fighting, leaving two isolated states to pursue an arms race with each other, and with the other countries in the region.
What were the original causes that brought Iran and Iraq to war? Were they a combination of societal, cultural, and economic causes, or did war result from the actions and desires of individual leaders? If the causes of war were not settled after the UN ceasefire, will the two countries fight again, and, if so, what events might signal renewed hostilities? The purpose of this paper is to try and answer these questions.
To begin our discussion, Chapter Two explores some of the generally accepted causes of the 1980-1989 Iran-Iraq war, including differences in both the religious and cultural makeup of the two countries. We then move on to examine the leaders who held power at the start of the war, Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini in Iran, and President Saddam Hussein of Iraq. This chapter sets up the argument that the war was primarily a struggle resulting from the relationship between these two men, who brought their nations along for the ride. Finally, we compare the military strengths of each country at the beginning of the war, in an attempt to draw some conclusions about each leader's perceptions of the other's strengths, and how that may have helped set the stage for war in 1980.
Chapter Three examines the endstate of the Iran-Iraq war by comparing how the terms of the UN cease-fire did, or did not, fulfill the original objectives of Khomeini and Saddam Hussein. In order to do that, we again compare some of the causes of the war with the situation which currently exists between the two countries. The chapter concludes by comparing the military strengths of Iran and Iraq at the end of the war.
Chapter Four looks at the current political leaders, their policies, and military strengths and weaknesses. How is each country different than in 1980 and how are they the same? This chapter sets the stage for the discussion of capabilities and intentions which follows.
In Chapter Five we take a look at the relationship between capabilities and intentions.
An understanding of this relationship is critical since an examination of a nation's capabilities is a necessary part of determining whether or not its leaders will decide to make war. The quest for military capabilities often provides a hint of what a nation's intent may be, for example, if a nation continues to strive for a significant military advantage over its neighbors, its intentions may be hostile. Capabilities alone, however, do not tell the whole story. Only when we combine capabilities with an assessment of the leader's will to use them can we begin to ascertain their intentions.
The final chapter re-introduces the notion of the individual struggle between Saddam
Hussein and the leader of Iran, be it Ayatollah Khomeini, or his successor. By looking at Saddam as the "individual," and the leaders of Iran as the "conditions" which dictate the individual's behavior, a prediction for future conflict is possible. The paper concludes with a suggested list of the pre-conditions which might signal the beginning of another war. Hopefully, the items on the list might be useful as indicators for foreign policy decision-makers and military planners.
Causes-1980
Iran and Iraq did not start fighting in 1980 simply because most Iranians are Persians while most Iraqis are Arabs. They did not fight because of differences between the Shi'a and Sunni sects of Islam, even though the Iranians are ruled by Shi'as and the Iraqis by Sunnis. They also did not go to war over land, water, or oil, although all of these issues have been cited as causes for the war. In all likelihood, these two countries went to war because of a conflict between two men. One of these men, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, feared the power of the other man, Iranian leader Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini.
Saddam's fear was the primary cause of this war.
So, when we start our look into the causes of the war, we should focus on what drove Saddam Hussein to fear Iran, since Iran's initial motivation for fighting was basically a defensive, survival-based rationale. This is not to say that Iran was an innocent bystander, wrongly attacked by a belligerent neighbor. On the contrary, Iran did as much, or more, to set the stage for hostilities. It was merely Iraq who fired the first shots, out of fear.
What caused this fear? Although Iran has a larger population and more territory; conditions which would lead Iraq to consider Iran a geopolitical threat, these conditions existed before Khomeini came to power in Iran. Nevertheless, even Saddam Hussein, who held nearly absolute authority over his people, had to find a supportable cause in order to motivate the Iraqi population to wage war. Saddam's personal fear of losing political power at the hands of Khomeini was not sufficient rationale for mobilizing public support. Consequently, he realized he must bring to bear some of the deeply rooted causes of traditional mistrust and hatred between his people and the people of Iran in order to incite the Iraqis to violence. Saddam chose two major differences between Iranians and Iraqi and then exploited them. The first one being the differences between the Sunni and Shi'a sect of Islam, and the second one being the differences between Iraqi Arabs and Iranian Persians.
Let's discuss the religious differences first. Although Muslims of both sects live in both countries, Iran is governed by leaders belonging to the Shi'a sect of Islam, while Iraq is governed by individuals associated with the Sunni sect. This difference in religious affiliation has its roots in the death of the Prophet Muhammad in AD 632 and the struggle to determine who would succeed him as both head of the Islamic State, and leader of the Islamic faith. This "problem of succession" resulted in a factional split as the supporters of Muhammad's cousin and adopted son Ali, who felt that he was the rightful successor, became known as Shi'at Ali, or partisans of Ali. This title was later shortened to simply Shi'a. The other faction was made up of people who believed that any member of Muhammad's tribe, the Quraysh, could rightfully succeed Muhammad as Caliph, or spiritual leader. They believed that they were following the Prophet's true desires and hence came to be known as Sunni, which comes from Sunna, or "way of the prophet."
The basic question was one of whether successors to Muhammad ruled by divine right (i.e.
since Muhammad was proclaimed as Prophet by divine right, only his direct ancestors had the right to succeed him) or whether any qualified member of the Quraysh tribe could be appointed by committee.
This competition for the leadership of Islam was not always a peaceful discourse on the legitimacy of one group over the other. For example, the third caliph, Uthman ibnAffan, was murdered by one of Ali's supporters in AD 656, setting the stage for Ali to assume the caliphate. 2 The issue of succession and the hatred it inspired continues to have relevance today as a deeply emotional issue for many Muslims and Saddam efficiently manipulated the staterun Iraqi media in order to put forth his message of contempt for Iranian Shi'as. For example, when Saddam Hussein's forces invaded Iran in 1980, he proclaimed the campaign to be the "second Qadesiya," a reference to the first battle of Qadesiya in AD 635 when the armies of Caliph Umar, an early Sunni leader, defeated the Iranians during the early spread of Islam. Now we can move on to the second tool which Saddam used to rally public support; the traditional differences between the Arabs of Iraq and the predominantly Persian population of Iran. These differences are as deeply rooted as the religious separation and were often exacerbated by the Iranians themselves, who were the "only major group conquered by the Arabs who consistently kept their identity as a people." They, "thought of themselves as different from the rest of the Muslims and thereby consistently aroused the hostility of others." 3 When the Iranians officially adopted the Shi'a religion, this only served to make the differences between them and the rest of the Arab/Muslim world more pronounced. When expertly manipulated by Saddam, the issues of religion and culture were sufficient to inflame Iraqi passions for war. 
Chapter 3
The End State-1989
The war ended with a cease-fire which was put into effect on August 20, 1988 In other words, he conducted a cost vs. benefit analysis and determined that the distribution of power was in his favor, and that the time to strike was now. This may lead us to begin to see that Saddam Hussein is more of a rational figure than is popularly thought. We'll come back to that idea later. First, let's examine more closely some of the factors which may have entered into Saddam's analysis.
In his article on the war, Edmund Ghareeb stated several reasons why Iraq went to war, some of which I have already mentioned. In terms of overall capability, the Iranian army is probably better prepared to fight
Iraq than it was in 1980. The armies' leadership has, at the very least, survived the eight year war, and has realized that mass human-wave attacks by untrained conscripts are not an effective fighting tactic. The Iranian army should be considered defensive in nature, and could probably resist an invasion by Iraq. It is not, however, robust enough to present a viable offensive threat to Iraq. 7 The army is assessed to consist of 10-12 regular divisions, consisting of four armor, seven infantry, and one special forces divisions, with a total strength of about 195,000 soldiers. They are supported by 150,000 Revolutionary Guards in 28-30 divisional "structures." 8 Iran's current inventory of 700 to 800 tanks includes a small number of Polish-built T-72s, but is generally assessed to be inferior to Western armored forces. 9 Likewise, Iran's air force is probably more prepared to defend Iranian territory against Iraqi incursion than it was in 1980. It does not, however, have the capability to attain air superiority over the border area, much less for offensive operations inside Iraq.
In terms of parity with Iraq, Iran does not currently possess equal capability, even if it were to employ the Iraq aircraft which were left in Iran after the Gulf War. It's inventory of approximately 195 combat-ready aircraft includes US F-14s, F-5s, and F-4s along with about 65 MiG-29s and Su-24s. 10 Iran's air force suffers from the same problems as most Middle Eastern air forces, while they have reasonably good aircraft and pilots, they lack the capability to sustain significant sortie rates over more than a few days, and cannot command and control large formations of aircraft in the way that many Western air forces, the USAF in particular, are able to. Iran may be able to gain rough parity with Iraq, in numbers of aircraft and pilots, by the end of the 1990s.
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The Iranian navy outclasses the Iraqi navy by a wide margin, but it is important to remember that this advantage may have limited value in a future war with Iraq.
Nevertheless, Iran continues to rebuild its navy, having recently acquired at least one Kiloclass conventionally powered submarine, in its attempt to become a viable naval presence in the Persian Gulf. 12 Iraq continues to recover its military capability in the wake of the Gulf War.
Although the Iraqi army is much smaller and less capable than it was in 1989, having been reduced from approximately 67 divisions to 30 divisions, 13 
Capabilities and Intentions
Up to this point, we have examined historical events and concentrated on facts and figures in an attempt to determine why Iran and Iraq fought their eight year war, how conditions have changed or remained the same, and if they were to fight again, who would win? In order to determine the likelihood of future hostilities, however, we must address one of the classic problems of military intelligence, that of assessing an enemy's intentions.
Why is it so difficult to determine intent? Perhaps it is because a nation's ability to carry out a policy does not necessarily mean that the nation intends to do so. Nor does a nation's inability to pursue a policy necessarily prevent it from making the attempt.
Perhaps, then, it is more useful to consider the process of gaining military capabilities, rather than the capabilities themselves, as a key to understanding intentions. This is certainly true in the case of both Iran and Iraq, whose policies center around building military strength and accruing regional power.
In the case of Iraq, Michael Eisenstadt describes Saddam Hussein's strategy for survival as consisting of three separate goals. First, he is striving to secure his own political survival in the wake of the Gulf War. Second, he wants to restore Iraq's sovereignty and independence, and reduce foreign interference in his affairs. Third, he is pursuing the restoration of his military capabilities. 1 Eisenstadt goes on to say that So we can conclude that both Iran and Iraq are headed down parallel paths of rebuilding their military strength, both conventional and unconventional, and that the leadership of both countries aspire to some level of regional hegemony. We can also agree that there are enough inflammatory issues; the Kurds, the Iraqi Shi'as, and the Iranian Mujihideed, to bring Iran and Iraq into periods of conflict. As the two states continue along their paths, their leaders, at one of these inflammatory periods or another, will be faced with the decision of whether or not to go to war to attempt to solve the conflict.
Geoffrey Blainey cites seven factors which influence leaders to go to war. 7 Of the seven, I have listed five below which I believe Saddam and Khameini would probably consider prior to launching a general war against the other:
1. Their military strength and ability to apply it. 2. Predictions of how outside nations will behave if war starts.
3. Their perceptions of internal unity/discord, and enemy unity/discord. 4. Nationalism and ideology. 5. The ability of their economy to sustain a war effort.
By examining the current situation in Iran and Iraq using these factors, we can make some useful assessments about the possibility of future war between the two states.
Reason 1. Military Strength. It is unlikely that either Saddam or Khameini consider
their military forces capable of resuming general war against the other, and it is also unlikely that that situation will change for at least the next five to ten years. The important thing to remember is that both states are racing to achieve a military capability that will enable their leaders to consider war as a viable option. Iran's industrial sector is experiencing low productivity, lack of foreign exchange, and a lack of raw materials. 13 Iraq, although recently having received authorization to begin pumping 700 barrels of oil per day for a period of six months, is still suffering from the effects of the Iran/Iraq war and the Gulf War. "As of November, 1996, Iraq's economic outlook is grim, with little chance of the economy rising much above providing only the basic necessities and services." 14 Even though both countries have "often chosen guns over butter" 15 this may be more than a question of whether Iran and Iraq's economies can sustain a war effort.
Both leaders will have to decide if going to war is worth risking the actual survival of their economies, as neither country is progressing economically even during peace time.
Another war, of the intensity and duration of the 1980-1989 war, could effectively destroy one or both of these state's economies.
In this chapter we linked capabilities and intentions by examining the difference between what a country is trying to achieve and what it can actually achieve. The fact that both countries are actively striving to increase both conventional and unconventional military capability provides an indicator of both Iran and Iraq's intentions. We also discussed several key areas which the leaders of both countries would probably consider prior to engaging in another war. The final chapter will take a more in-depth look at Saddam Hussein, as the key decision maker, who will ultimately choose peace or war, based on his perception of the Iranian threat.
Future Conflict-2000 and Beyond
Now we come to the most difficult and riskiest part of this paper; a prediction.
Another war between Iran and Iraq is not inevitable, but there are sufficient reasons to suspect that the two countries will continue to remain antagonistic with regard to each other, and that these antagonisms could lead to another war. The difficulty in predicting war is due in part to the fact that, primarily, we are dealing with the personalities of a few Once he makes a decision, he is absolutely ruthless in carrying out his policies. 3 Saddam is a survivor. His entire early life revolved around gaining and maintaining power in order to survive the harsh conditions in which he grew up. At the time of
Saddam's childhood, the infant mortality rate in rural Iraq averaged 33 percent.
Essentially fatherless, Saddam was raised by an abusive stepfather and actually carried an iron bar for protection against other boys, who consistently harassed him. He was known to use this bar to physically beat and dismember stray animals that wandered into his path.
Saddam was denied entry into the Iraqi Military Academy, thus thwarting his lifelong desire to obtain an officer's commission. This aspect of his past helps to explain his frequent behavior of appearing in military uniform, wearing the "honorary" rank of general and may also help to explain his apparent predisposition to select military solutions to foreign and internal policy problems. Aref, a calculated and ultimately unsuccessful risk which resulted in a two year prison term. 5 Saddam lives by the principle that physical force is a necessary requirement for the attainment and maintenance of power. 6 This view of Saddam makes it easier to believe that another war with Iran is not only likely, but almost unavoidable, if he remains at the pinnacle of Iraqi political power.
This does not mean, however, that Saddam will strike before he has the capability and wherewithal to assure, at least in his mind, a high probability of success. Several preconditions will make his decision to go to war tenable, and by monitoring Saddam's progress toward attaining these conditions, we can hope to assess his intentions and timing.
First, Iraq will continue to consolidate and rebuild its conventional military forces.
This will take place through a combination of imported materiel and domestic increases in production. Second, Iraq will continue to evade UN inspectors and further develop its weapons of mass destruction. Third, Saddam, in keeping with his nature, will play by the rules just enough to slowly erode UN resolve, and the sanctions against Iraq will gradually be weakened. Consequently, Iraq will be able to use increased oil revenues to buy or build new military equipment, and the Iraqi people's quality of life will improve enough to prevent wide scale civil unrest.
Assuming that Saddam can accomplish these three goals and rebuild his capability to a point where he perceives that he has significant superiority over Iran, he may hold a future attack as a sort of "trump card" to be played in one or more of the following situations. There is a high probability that he will do so again. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid., 17. 6 Ibid., 24
